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Introduction
In dedicating themselves to shared governance in respect to economic matters, the
European Union (EU) has been able to maintain peace and stability, in a region affected by two
devastating world wars, which left pain and destruction in its path. In its earliest form, the
European Coal and Steel Community held peace and economic stability at the forefront of the
organization.1 This dedication to peace and economic stability would allow for countries within
the region to grow from the ashes. In the span of several decades and numerous territorial and
ideological expansions, the ECSC has become the European Union known today. Becoming the
largest economy in the world with a collective GDP of $18.7 trillion and generating roughly $22
trillion in economic output, the European Union has been able to garner large economic power
within the world.2 With over 64 % of EU countries' total trade is done with other countries in the
bloc,3 the European Union has had much success with forming a competitive economy while
securing peace among member states through treaties and multilateral agreements. These treaties
and agreements have increased the interdependence among member states, and has made war or
armed conflict virtually impossible.
Present-day EU stands as a political and economic union between twenty-eight European
member states prior to the formalization of Brexit. With the implementation of a common
currency and lowered barriers for movement between national borders, EU residents, capital,
goods, and technology are able to freely travel between member states, thus increasing the

1

Anonymous. “The EU in Brief.” European Union, 16 June 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/euin-brief_en.
2
Amadeo, Kimberly. “Why China Is the World’s Largest Economy.” The Balance,
https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044. Accessed 6 Dec. 2019.
3
Anonymous. “The Economy.” European Union, 5 July 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/abouteu/figures/economy_en.
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interdependence and strength of the Union. With the motto “United in diversity"4, the EU
showcases the unity within the bloc, despite the differences in language, customs, and religions
of many peoples within the European bloc. Or does it?
Although European Union member states have enjoyed many benefits, there have also
been a variety of setbacks brought upon by the growing disparities of relative power amongst Eu
member states. These disparities have caused various member states to become resentful toward
the EU and become distrusting for plans for further expansion of the EU. One of the most
publicized examples of these member states is the United Kingdom (UK), which due to its
discontent with the EU decided to separate from the Union. On Thursday, June 23, 2016, the UK
government posed the question: ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European
Union or leave the European Union?’5 to the general public in the form of a referendum. After
counting 26.3 million voting papers and 7.2 million early votes, the UK had spoken: they will be
enacting Article 50 and breaking away from the European Union. With 52% of the popular vote,
the movement in favor of leaving the union won the referendum, while 48% of the populace
voted in favor of remaining a member. With a turnout of 72.2% of UK eligible voters,
representing more than 30 million people, the results of the electorate were undeniable.6 With the
ratification of Article 50 on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
(UK), the process for the termination of the UK’s membership of the European Union began,
thus decreasing the number of EU member states to twenty-seven. This was the first time in the
history of the European Union, a member state has decided to leave the Union. At the time of
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Anonymous. “The EU Motto.” European Union, 16 June 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/abouteu/symbols/motto_en.
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Zaken, Ministerie van Buitenlandse. What Is Brexit? - Government.Nl. 30 Aug. 2018, topics/brexit/question-andanswer/what-is-brexit.
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Clarke, Harold D., et al. Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union. Cambridge University Press,
2017.
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writing of this paper, the United Kingdom is scheduled to no longer be a member of the EU on
January 31, 2020. For the purposes of this paper, the UK is assumed to be leaving the Union by
the selected date in order to prevent the further complication of the debate.
Much like in the case of the United Kingdom, many other member states, such as Poland,
Hungary, and Austria, are experiencing increased levels of frustrations toward the EU. Although
the UK remains the only example in which these frustrations have led to the enactment of Article
50, a number of political parties have capitalized on these concerns and frustrations. Resentment
and discontent towards the Union have caused organizations and political parties to argue against
further EU initiatives and expansions. Current governments of member states such as Poland,
Hungary, and Austria, have capitalized on the fear of the EU encroaching on national
sovereignty by using migrants as examples of how the EU does not consider the needs of its own
member states first. Populist governments use the fear associated with the European Union to
instill sentiments of nationalism, identitarianism, protectionism, isolationist, sovereignism,
creating an increasing divide between the European Union and its member states.7 Political
parties such as the Alternative for Germany Party (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) of Poland,
the National Rally Party (Rassemblement national, RN) of France, and the Law and Justice Party
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) of Poland have utilized the fear of migrants, the loss of national
sovereignty, and a weak economy to further their agenda and garner more support within the
country.8

7

Macron, Emmanuel. Sorbonne speech of Emmanuel Macron - Full text / English version.
http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html.
Accessed 4 Dec. 2019.
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In response to these movements, many political figures have publicly supported the
European Union and endorsed programs that revitalize the movement towards further
integration. Current President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, for example, gave a
speech to members of the European community to favor his plan for an increase in levels of
sovereignty for the EU through the creation of EU sponsored initiatives.9 Within the first few
minutes of his speech, Macron reminds the member states of the EU’s mission to provide peace
and economic stability to all its member states. Today’s EU has strayed away from the original
concept of the EU with its ideas of nationalism and isolationism. Macron argues the European
Union has for far too long been dependent on other nations, predominantly the United States, for
things such as security and the creation of a globalized economy. Therefore the European Union
must make it a priority to finance and develop a common European Union military to expand its
sovereignty from other global actors.
The proposal for the creation of a European Union military has sparked a debate within
the bloc concerning the validity for the need of an EU military. A couple days following
President Macron’s speech at Sorbonne University, German Chancellor Angela Merkel,
pronounced her own support for the plan of a European Union military.10 Since then, the
governments of Spain, Hungary, and Italy have also expressed their interest in the plan.
Although there has been a variety of support within the bloc for the creation of a European
Union army, there are many other member states and political parties/groups that have remained
neutral or plainly reject the proposed plan. Even amongst its support, many still debate the
desired scope of the European Union Military’s jurisdiction. One might expect that the more

9

Macron, Emmanuel. Sorbonne speech of Emmanuel Macron
Merkel, Angela. “Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 13
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powerful France, Germany, and Spain would be least supportive of the plan because their
relative costs would be higher, while the border nations that are more likely to enjoy the benefits
while not sharing the cost, would be most supportive. Yet, this is not the case.
Member states such as Germany and France are more likely to be in favor of financing
and developing an EU military due to their higher relative authority within the bloc compared to
lower-income member states. Although these member states would have to contribute the most
funding, they would also gain more influence with the bloc’s foreign policy. On the other hand,
member states with less relative power within the bloc may be more skeptic about the intentions
of the military and will be less likely to support it. Countries such as Poland, Austria, and
Hungary, who have all showed signs of nationalistic and Eurosceptic ideologies, are more likely
to vote against an EU military in order to appease an already frustrated electorate for their
respective countries. The debate is only further complicated when introducing the nature of the
EU military. An EU military that works in conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) is favored more by countries such as Germany, Austria, and Spain while a
sovereign EU military is supported by countries ensure about the reliability of NATO for
European Security, such as France, Hungary, and Poland.

Literature Review
Since the Great Recession, various member states within the European Union have
experienced rising sentiments of populism and nationalism. Although more strongly felt in
border member states such as Poland, Austria, and Hungary, these nationalistic and Eurosceptic
populist movements have sprung up and gained strength in most if not all EU member states.11

11
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Authors of the article titled, The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism, for example,
attribute the rise in the strength of populist leaders to two main reasons.12 The first reason for the
spread of populist ideologes comes as a response to progressive values, such as cosmopolitanism
and multiculturalism. Populist leaders are able to capitalize on the fears of losing national
cultural identity and instill ideas of resentment towards EU and National policies that allow for a
greater flow of cultural diffusion. The second reason for the rise in populism focuses on
economic insecurity, which originated from globalization and the transformation of the supply
chain. Outsourcing, the increased competition from low-wage countries, and automation of
certain supply chain processes allow for sharp increases in unemployment in Europe. With
increased levels of migrants due to the instability within the Middle East following the recent
global financial crisis, many citizens view the migrants as the cause of their economic and
financial issues. When the European Union allows migrants to settle within the bloc and compete
for jobs, member states believe the bloc is focused more on the well-being of the migrants than
the health of the member states’ economies. This disillusionment towards the EU increases the
resentment and frustrations felt by member states, thus increasing the hesitance for further EU
expansion to other realms of governance.
Although it is very important to analyze the importance of an EU military in the current
political climate, most countries already believe a common defense policy and/or a fully
functional EU military would be strengthen to the agenda the bloc is trying to peddle. Books
such as, The European Union as a Global Actor, for example, written by Charlotte Bretherton
and John Vogler, focus on the European Union’s ambition to become a global actor, which is

12
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suppressed by the lack of institutions directly abled to tackle issues of foreign policy as a bloc.13
Bretherton and Vogler argue that despite the European Union’s success as an economic power,
the EU lacks the appropriate institutions and/or set of policies to become an effective actor.
While the EU has been very successful with the providing development and humanitarian aid as
well as becoming a leader in green technology and environmental governance, it has lagged
behind in forming relations with key regional actors such as Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey, as well
as providing a clear Common Foreign and Security Policy in response to more contemporary
issues such as terrorism and political instability.
The point of contention for the EU military is the nature of the military within the EU and
NATO framework. An EU military with higher levels of control within the realm of security and
defense, which are typically competencies of member states, or more likely to be rejected by
member states who do not believe the EU does not take their needs in consideration during the
decision making process. Member states with lower relative power within the bloc, and higher
levels of Euroscepticism and populism are more likely to be against an EU military due to the
potential point of contention an expanded EU competence in the field of defense can cause for
national sovereignty. When making a decision on whether to create an EU military, member
states essentially have to make a decision between maintaining NATO as the predominant
defense mechanism within the bloc or whether the EU should create an EU military, independent
or collaborative with the NATO, that focuses on foreign policy initiatives proposed by the bloc.
While there has been much research on the advantages of a common defense policy such
as the CSDP as well as the common EU military proposed by President Macron, few researchers
have analyzed the effect of national politics and agenda of member states within the EU blocs on
13

Bretherton, Charlotte, et al. The European Union as a Global Actor. Routledge, 2005. www-taylorfranciscom.ccl.idm.oclc.org, doi:10.4324/9780203022672.
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the finalized plan of the military institutions. Due to its contemporary and ongoing nature, works
regarding the European Union defense system are based more on theories of the effects of new
institutions as well as the expansion of already approved or existing policies and plans. In order
to best identify the political reasons behind the struggles member states currently, this paper shall
use books and analytical pieces concerning the needs of proper EU institutions and funding for
an EU common military, aspects of a successful common militaries, and the EU’s role as a
global actor, with articles released by European Think Tanks as well as EU and member state
press releases that are relevant to the defense ambitions in the EU.
This paper will look at the relationship between a member state’s relative power within
the EU to the levels of favorability these member states hold towards the creation of a European
Union military. In doing so, this paper will cover three aspects of the debate concerning the
creation of the EU military: the development of the current mechanism for the EU’s security and
defense initiatives, the proposed plan for the European Union Military and its respective points
of contention, and the variety of positions held by some of the member states.

Current EU Security Mechanisms
In order to understand the current structure of the EU security mechanisms, it is
important to take a look at the steps leading up to the creation of a singular security policy. The
first incarnation of a common defense mechanism within the European Union came in the form
of the Western European Union. Although it worked very closely with the European Union, the
Western European Union remained independent from EU affairs for a majority of its existence.
Founded in 1948, with modifications to come in 1954, the Western European Union became the
primary defense mechanism for the European Union until its official closing in 2011 to be
replaced by the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy. Prior to the creation of NATO, the
10

Western European Union provided the initial framework for a European defense policy as well
as NATO and the Council of Europe. Originally signed created through the Brussels treaty, the
WEU was first signed by the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the United
Kingdom, and in 1954 would later include West Germany and Italy. Administered by a council
consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs and of defense of the member countries and headed
by a secretary-general, the WEU was tasked to assist with economic recovery amongst Western
European member states, offer mutual military assistance in the case of external aggression, and
the promotion of unity and integration.
Although Article 5 would ‘afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and
assistance in their power’ and this aid would remain ‘in accordance with the provisions of Article
51 of the Charter of the United Nations’, this power would, later on, be held by NATO to which
all WEU participating member states also were signees of. Due to NATO’s role as the Defense
provider to members of the WEU, the council, between 1954 and 1984, became responsible for
providing a forum for policy formulation and discussions concerning defensive protocols for
WEU member states in the case of external actors. These policies and discussions oftentimes
remained focus on the ability for NATO to respond to its defense needs rather than any
implementation of any WEU policies to prevent or act upon any act of aggression. Unlike the
European Union who’s jurisdiction within the fields of economic integration and political
cooperation has grown, the WEU’s jurisdiction remained the same during this time.
A change in the scope of the WEU would come until the Declaration by the WEU
Foreign and Defense Ministers, produced in Rome, on October 27, 1984. In this Declaration, the
WEU Foreign and Defense Ministers announced their decision, “to hold comprehensive
discussions … on the specific conditions of security in Europe, In particular: … arms control

11

and disarmament, the effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of
Europe, Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance [NATO], [and]
may also Consider the Implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world.”14 With
this Declaration, the WEU was able to expand its view of a common security policy to a
European scale as well as the potential for raising concerns pertaining to issues outside the
region. In 1992, released the Petersberg Declaration created by the WEU Council of Ministers in
Bonn, Germany. Within the Petersberg Declaration, the WEU introduced a set of criteria for
WEU military interventions, which included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks,
and tasks of combat forces for the purpose of peacemaking, later to be known as the Petersberg
tasks. Although the WEU would be increasing its capabilities, and thus creating direct
competition with NATO, the WEU in the Petersberg Declaration Reaffirmed its conviction to
NATO. In the declaration, they state, “the Atlantic Alliance [NATO] is one of the indispensable
foundations of Europe's security. They [WEU] welcomed the ongoing reform process of NATO
with a view to establishing a strong new transatlantic partnership.”15
The Western European Union saw its first member state expansion in November of 1988,
with the signing of the Protocol of Accession by the WEU Member States granting Portugal and
Spain official full membership in March of 1990. In a Declaration released on December 10,
1991, and ultimately included within the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, the Member States of
Western European Union sent an invitation to all the Member States of the EU, not already
members of the WEU, status as an observer or member of WEU, and the European Member

14

Western European Union - Union de l'Europe occidentale. [EN LIGNE]. [Bruxelles]: Union de l'Europeoccidentale,
[02.08.2002]. Disponible sur http://www.weu.int/index.html.
15
Western European Union, and Western European Union Council of Ministers (19-06-1992 : Bonn). Petersberg
Declaration: Declaration on Nagorno-Karabakh. Declaration on the Yugoslav Crisis. Declaration After the
Extraordinary Meeting of the Weu Council of Ministers with the States of Central Europe. WEU, 1992.
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States of NATO to become associate members of WEU.16 In 1994, the WEU was further
expanded by the creation of an Associate Partner title, for ten European democratic nations to
become involved in a common European defense organization. During this period of WEU
expansion, the European Union began included similar clauses into their own treaties. This led to
the eventual absorption of the WEU policies into the European Union and the WEU’s formal
shut down on June 30, 2011.
Prior to the absorption of the Western European Union policies into the European Union
treaties, the EU’s expansion of competencies led to the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam by
all EU member states. Under the guise of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Union was
able to expand its competencies to include foreign affairs and defense policies. Influenced by the
WEU’s Petersberg Tasks, the EU was able to increase incorporate clauses that would allow the
EU to intervene militarily in response to peacekeeping and humanitarian concerns. The inclusion
of these tasks into the treaty became known as the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Within the Treaty of Amsterdam, it states, “The common foreign and security policy shall
include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a
common defence policy…which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council
so decide” thus setting the foundations for the eventual creation of the Common Security and
Defense Policy used in the EU currently.
During the Franco–British Summit held in St. Malo on December 3rd and 4th of 1998,
between the then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and then-President Jacques Chirac of France.,
the leaders furthered talks about the EU’s role in a European defense mechanism. The
declaration affirms the need for the EU’s ‘capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible
16

Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht Agreement on JSTOR. https://www-jstororg.ccl.idm.oclc.org/stable/761098#metadata_info_tab_contents. Accessed 8 Dec. 2019.
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military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to
international crises.’17 Although important, the two leaders also allude to WEU’s ineffectiveness.
The declaration states, “Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the
European Union (European Council, General Affairs Council, and meetings of Defence
Ministers).” Rather than having a duplication in competences between the WEU and EU, which
is an inefficient use of resources, WEU policies should be implemented within the EU through
preexisting institutions. These points set the stage for the conversation held one year later during
the European Council meeting in Cologne, Germany.
The European Council meeting in Cologne, Germany, marked one of the largest
expansion the EU rolled out within the field of defense and security. During the council meeting,
the member states agreed upon the use of military intervention (the EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy) independent of NATO as well as the creation of institutions to help with the
implementation of such policies. The CFSP would require, the EU’s General Affairs Council in
conjunction with the Defense ministers of each member states if needed, to hold regular
meetings in order to discuss manners that concern the security of the bloc or any ongoing
military intervention. Additionally, the CFSP allowed for the creation of a ‘permanent body in
Brussels, the Political and Security Committee), which consists of representatives with political
and/or military expertise, an EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives
making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee; a EU Military Staff including

17

Joint Declaration on European Defence. Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, 3-4
December 1998. [ON-LINE]. [s.l.]: Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, [12.08.2008].
Disponible sur http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=News&id=2244063.
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a Situation Centre; [and] other resources such as a Satellite Centre, Institute for Security
Studies.’18
Although the European Union’s policies were intended for further EU integration in the
area of foreign affairs and security, the European Council meeting aimed to guarantee
protections on member states’ sovereignty as well as outline important principles for the
successful creation of a common security and defense policy. In order to guarantee all member
states have complete control over the levels of participation within any given intervention
initiative which uses military force, the EU reserves the right for member states to indicate
whether they would like to participate in the initiative and when they would like to deploy the
military assistance. Anticipating further EU initiatives toward integration in the field of defense
and security, the European Council created a list of principles deemed necessary for the creation
of the Common Defense and Security Policy, as well. These five principles would mark the
cornerstone of the present-day defense mechanism within the EU. These principles include the
equal participation of all EU member states as well as non-allied members; the creation of an
arrangement with European NATO members to ensure the fullest possible involvement in EU
led initiatives, and thus building on the pre-existing arrangements held under the jurisdiction of
the Western European Union (WEU); the guarantee that all participating member states on an
operation/initiative hold equal rights and protections on the ground as well as in the decision
making process such is the case in the Council level; the need for a clear method of effective
mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU; the ability for
WEU Associate Partners to be involved in EU operations.

18

Cologne European Council, Presidency Conclusions. Annex III. [ON-LINE]. [s.l.]: [06.06.2003]. Press: 0 Nr:150/99.
Available on http://ue.eu.int/en/info/eurocouncil/.
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In order to carry out an operation, the participating member states in an operation would
be dependent on the use of national command structures or preexisting multinational command
structures within the EU to organize and deploy the military aid. Due to the EU’s lack of
institutions capable of organizing and deploying military forces, the EU arranged an agreement
with NATO that would allow for the use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU led missions in
the case member states would not be able to organize the military force in a member’s command
structure. In a series of negotiations with NATO, finalized in 2003, the EU and NATO worked a
plan for the use of NATO assets for EU led operations known as the Berlin Plus Agreement. The
Berlin Plus Agreement allowed for the use of NATO planning capabilities by the EU for EU led
civilian and military operations under the condition both parties agree on a NATO-EU Security
Agreement to exchange classified information under reciprocal security protection rules; a set
procedure for the release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities; terms of
usage for the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe; a system for EU-NATO consultation
during EU-led operations that make use of NATO assets and capabilities; and a plan for the
reinforcement of military and civilian capabilities that may be required during operations led by
the EU.19
It would only take a few months for the defense policies of the EU to be placed put to the
test. With the start of the US’ intervention in Iraq, questions over the EU’s role in the
intervention efforts of the US and UK rose within the bloc. Division within the EU made it clear
for the need of a common strategic vision to maintain unity amongst the member states.20 As a

19

Joint press statement by the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency, 3 June 2003, summarizing progress
made in NATO-EU cooperation since the joint Declaration of 16 December 2002
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-056e.htm
20
“Iraq War | Summary, Causes, Combatants, & Facts.” Encyclopedia Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War. Accessed 8 Dec. 2019.

16

response to this indecision, the European Council adopted a policy named ‘A Secure Europe in a
Better World’ as the main piece of the European Security Strategy. This security policy looked
towards a multilateral approach to addressing the key threats to EU security which included
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and
organized crime.21 The European Security Strategy (ESS) would call for the use of multilateral
organizations such as the UN and regional organizations as the first line of defense against
possible breaches in safety. The use of violence would be the last resort option, due to the fear of
causing further instability within the region, such was the case with Iraq. In response to the
concerns brought by the ESS, the EU enacted a neighborhood policy which called for the
increase of security protocols in ‘the EU’s neighborhood’ which includes the Balkans, Southern
Caucasus, and the general Mediterranean region.22 With the EU’s increased capacity to intervene
and a growing fear of violence, EU member states believed it in their best interest to intervene as
a global actor in a responsible and multilateral fashion.
The current form of the EU defense mechanism comes in the form of the Common
Security and Defense Policy, introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon sets a
very important structure to the already complex organization known as the European Union.
Although the Lisbon Treaty did not extend the number of exclusive competences the EU has, it
does provide an alternative to how power is exercised within the Union to increase the levels of
citizen participation and transparency. Specifically, in the realm of EU security and defense, the
Lisbon Treaty condenses the past 20 years of EU policies regarding security while adding

21

European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World.
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important institutions, under a singular policy known as the Common Security and Defense
Policy (CSDP). The CSDP would add a clause that guarantees mutual assistance and solidarity in
the case of external aggression towards a member state, a framework for an eventual Permanent
Structured Cooperation (PESCO), expansions of Petersberg Tasks, and the creation of a
European External Action Service (EEAS) to be overseen by the High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
In Section 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the EU sets the provisions for the
Common Security and Defense Policy. It begins with the main purpose of the CSPD which is to,
‘provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The
Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and
strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter.’23 These same missions must also be compatible with previously agreed-upon
arrangements with NATO, due to its importance in the implementation of various military and
civilian operations. The responsibility for proposing an initiative falls upon the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or a Member State, but it is
exclusively the High Representative’s duty to propose the use of national resources and EU
capabilities. Reasons for intervention can range between, ‘joint disarmament operations,
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and
peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and
post-conflict stabilization.’
The treaty also acknowledges the need for a European Defense Agency, tasked with
identifying operation requirements, the promotion of measure that will satisfy these operation
23

Anonymous. “Treaty on European Union.” European Union, 5 July 2016, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/law/treaties_en.
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requirements, contribute to the strengthening of the industrial and technological base sector in
relation to the EU’s military capabilities, and identifying a cohesive European capabilities and
armaments policy. Although open to all member states, participation in the European Defense
Agency is optional. Currently, the European Defense Agency creates and manages a variety of
institutions and policy agendas, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the
Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), European Defense Fund (EDF), the
Capability Development Plan (CDP), and other key capability programs.
Although the Lisbon Treaty adds more capabilities to the CSDP, it also maintains many
of the original goals and institutions. Under the solidarity clause, for example, states, “the Union
and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if an EU Member State is the
object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.”24 Likewise under the
Treaty on European Union, ‘if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory,
the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the
means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.’25 By
including these two clauses into the treaties, the Treaty of Lisbon is able to guarantee a mutual
assurance amongst member states, seen since the formation of the WEU. This clause though is
subject to the caveat that any policy enacted by the EU be consistent with the commitments
already agreed upon under NATO.
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Plan for an EU Military
Thanks to the incredible progress made in preventing armed conflict between member
states, the European Union has been able to concentrate its efforts on improving the standard of
living for regions within the bloc as well as become a global actor. The EU’s ambitions to
become a stronger member of the global scene have led the bloc to invest in multiple fields of the
economy. The EU is a world leader in the sourcing of green energy and the EU is the largest
contributor of foreign aid in the world. In recent years, the EU has made substantial investments
in the field of security and defense. Despite such investments, various leaders around the bloc
has expressed their interest in a common military.
Origins for the creation of an EU military date prior to even the conception of the
European Union, and yet only recently has it become seriously debated within the block due to
the changes in the global political climate. In a speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the
Defense and Security Conference Prague titled, In defense of Europe, President Junker
elaborates on the need of an EU military. These sentiments would later be echoed with President
Emmanuel Macron’s speech at Sorbonne University. Cries for an EU military are centered
around one idea. In President Juncker’s speech he says,
“A stronger Europe on the global scene: a Union further developing existing
partnerships, building new ones and promoting stability and prosperity in its immediate
neighborhood to the east and south, but also in the Middle East and across Africa and
globally; a Union ready to take more responsibilities and to assist in creating a more
competitive and integrated defense industry; a Union committed to strengthening its
common security and defense, also in cooperation and complementarity with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, taking into account national circumstances and legal
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commitments; a Union engaged in the United Nations and standing for a rules-based
multilateral system, proud of its values and protective of its people, promoting free and
fair trade and a positive global climate policy.”26
President Juncker speaks to the ambitions of many within the EU and speaks upon what can be
possible. Although the EU’s ambitions are to become a global actor, President Juncker
recognizes the need for the EU member states to honor current agreements and the need for
collaboration with the international community for peace. The EU does not have to act alone in
the promotion of peace but rather would work most effectively but organizations such as NATO
and the United Nations. President Juncker argues, “NATO has been and will remain the
cornerstone of European security for decades. We are different but we complement each other in
so many ways – not least by the fact that we share 22 members. Competition between the EU
and NATO is not an option.”27 Although the idea of an EU military has been tossed around, the
question remains; what does this European Union Military look like?
The proposed plan for a European Union Military would make some key changes to the
way in which the EU is able to mobilize military forces. Under the current European Union
defense policy, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), grants the right for member
states to opt into any military action. When a moment arises in which the EU must intervene with
military force, a meeting among the European Council members is set and any willing
participants provide the resources for the military force to operate. This military force is created
for a singular purpose, and once the task has been completed, the force is disbanded until another
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intervention is required. Due to the EU’s lack of military infrastructure to coordinate and
mobilize an EU military force, the bloc is dependent on NATO logistical and operational
purposes. Although the EU will be less dependent on NATO, most member states believe the EU
military should maintain its close relationship with NATO. The EU will continue to respect the
previously agreed upon treaties but will create a system in which the EU will be able to mobilize
an operation free of any international actor.
The EU Military proposed by President Macron, allows for the creation of a well-funded
European Defense Fund, a clear decision-making institution, a European chain of Command
based in a civilian-military headquarters, and the development of a common defense planning
system. The creation of the European Defense Fund would allow for the investment in the
military of a united military force as well as continued research and development of new
technologies in the field of security and defense. A clear decision-making institution would
provide the EU military the necessary structure and member state input in matters of foreign
affairs. A European chain of Command based in a civilian-military headquarters would allow the
organizing of the EU military centered around a specific area with a specific structure resembling
national militaries. The development of a common defense planning system would allow for the
development of key capabilities needed for an EU military such as gathering intelligence and
discussions on tactical decisions.
In order to create an effective EU military, the EU would need to agree upon a Common
Defense Budget. It is very simple. In order for there to be a military, there must be funding for
the EU military to function. In the current system of funding in which member states who are
interested in pursuing a military or civilian intervention abroad would have to opt into the EU
task force and pay the necessary allocated costs to the member state, which has caused a growing
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reluctance to participate in the task forces. The creation of a common fund built into the annual
allocations for EU funding would allow the countries to not worry about finances when deciding
on whether to engage in a military or civilian intervention. The first steps in creating this budget
have already been taken. With the upcoming renewal of the Multi-annual Financial
Framework(MFF) for 2021-2028, the opportunity to push for more investment in the field of
security and defense has allowed the EU to look towards the future and allocate funds to cover a
European defense Budget. Currently, the MFF for the period 2021-2028, allows for the
distribution of EU funds to three different areas. The first worth €13 billion over the span of
seven years is the European Defense Fund, followed by a credit line allocated to “military
mobility” worth €6.5 billion over the seven years, and the European Peace Facility worth €10.5
billion over the span of the seven years. 28
With a larger funding the EU would be able to fund the acquisition of common
capabilities by the EU, for example an investment in infrastructure, with new bases, testing
centers, research centers designed for use on the EU scale, the connection of EU military
institutions through a completed communication network, as well as any military project more
efficiently run by a collective EU military. By investing in connectivity of the European Union
through the credit line allocated to “military mobility”, member states with external EU borders
and/or recently targeted member states through acts of aggression or terrorism will be able to
receive help in a much fast and efficient manner. Member states with external EU borders are
more likely to receive funds for the creation of bases and military units to safeguard the borders
from any aggression. With the rise of Russian influence in eastern European counties like
Ukraine, the need for a strong military presence in the area has become more important.
28
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Although many of these member states would have the support of NATO, the EU community
may be better equipped with knowledge to participate in any intervention.
In order to pay for these funds, the EU can do one of two things: increase the amount of
revenue collected from all member states or decrease the funding in one sector to make up for
investment placed into the common defense budget. Whether to decrease the amount of funding
allocated to other projects or to increase the revenue gathered from member states, certain
member states shall take a larger burden for the cost of the EU military.
To pay for the Common defense fund, the EU have to either increase the cost duties paid
though imports, increase the Value Added Tax, or increase the rate of national contributions. The
first source of income comes in the form of duties. When products from a country not a member
of the Customs Union, they are charged with common customs tariffs. Since the European Union
does not have a money collecting organization, individual member states are responsible in
collecting the appropriate common customs tariffs on incoming goods from non-EU countries at
all points of entry in the Union. The money collected by the individual countries are then sent
directly to the Commission headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.29 Once they have reached
Brussels, 20% of all the tariffs collected by each country are granted to each member state to
cover the cost of collection.30 In 2015, the EU’s revenue from customs duties is estimated to be
nearly 18.6 billion euros, making up 12.7 % of its total revenue.31
The second source of income comes in the form of a Value Added Tax. A value-added
tax, or VAT, is a tax imposed at each stage of a product’s the supply chain, from production to
the point of sale at every point where there has been an increase in a value of the good. This
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value-added tax is paid by the residents of each member state within in the European Union. It
effects not only the consumers who purchase goods for consumption, but also good
manufacturers who purchase products in order to create goods. In 2015, the European Union’s
total revenue from the Value Added Tax on its own resource was estimated to be at nearly 18.1
billion euros, making up 12.4 % of total revenue.
The third and final source of income for the European Union comes in the form of a
national contribution based on the gross national income (GNI) of each individual member state.
The national contributions are a way for the EU to cover the remainder of the costs associated
with EU functions, therefore the annual amount of national contributions varies for each fiscal
year. These national contributions are derived from annual member state budgets, therefore each
member state is responsible for collected their own taxes and allocating the specified amount of
the European Union. Today, the national contributions from each member state represent the
largest source of income for the European Union. In 2015, the European Union collected roughly
around 101 billion euros in national contributions which represented 69.14 % of the bloc’s total
revenue.
By increasing the rate of at least one of the aforementioned methods of revenue collection
for the European Union, the main contributors of the budget are disproportionately affected. The
main contributors to the budget are naturally the larger and richer member states. Over 70% of
the budget comes from five states: Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Spain. Due to their
overall size and economic strength, residents of these nations are the most likely to offset the
cost of the Common Defense Budget. Residents of these countries are more likely to purchase
imported and/or manufactured goods due to the higher standards of living and easier access to
capital. These member states are also the largest producers of manufactured goods in the bloc.
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Increased tax rates can cause prices for manufactured goods such as cars and clothing to go up
thus causing less residents around the EU to purchase the goods. Although different increased
rates have a variety effect on the economy, any increase in the rate of revenue collection would
hurt the pockets of the residents in larger and stronger economies, thus decreasing the possibility
for countries such as France, Germany, Spain, and Italy to support this increase. This is further
offset with the UK’s decision to leave the EU, creating a deficient in the budget already being
alleviated by member states such as Germany and France.
A rise in the revenue collection would affect all member states since every member state
imports good and produces manufactured goods sold within the Union. The concern arises in the
unequal pressure placed upon the member states. An unequal pressure is when A general
increase in the price of goods in member states such as France and Germany can lead to the
strengthening of populist movements within the country. Parties such as the National Rally (RN)
in France and the Alternative for Germany (Afd) rally around the resentment and frustrations
concerning the EU. Increasing the price of goods would increase the concern of an already
skeptical opposition. Marine Le Pen, for example, candidate for French president in the last
French election ran on a platform who’s foreign policy centered around the renegotiate of all the
European treaties within six months of her presidency. After the period of six months, the French
people on whether to accept or reject the newly negotiate terms. Le Pen also believed in a
withdrawal from the euro and the Schengen Agreements as well as the rejection of all free trade
accords.
In the case all member states are not able to agree on a way in which the EU can increase
its revenue, the EU is able to redirect funds away from some programs and/or initiatives to the
Common Defense Fund. Spending within the European Union is determined by the Multiannual
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Financial Framework (MFF). The MFF is a seven-year fiscal budget that sets annual limits for
EU spending and allocates money to a variety of different funds and initiatives. The MFF is
organized by fiscal years, with each year presenting the funding allocation of five categories,
also known as headings. These headings correspond to groupings of EU priorities and areas of
action related to EU functions. Currently, the European Union is operating under the 2014-2020
MFF member states are in negotiations for the creation of the 2021-2027 MFF, allowing the
possibility of an increase in the budget for defense spending.
As of the current 2014-2020 MFF, most of the EU budgetary spending is dominated by
two headings which include the Smart and inclusive growth as well as the Sustainable growth of
natural resources. Smart and inclusive growth aims to increase levels of efficiency in regards
though enterprise and development, by increasing the funding of projects that help with the
transfer and transportation of information, goods, services, and labor. The Connecting Europe
Facility (CEF), for example, helps increase the levels of connectivity amongst member states by
investing in the field of energy production, facilitation of transportation (terrestrial, aerial, and
martial), as well as common telecommunication systems. In order to help the less developed
regions within the Union, the EU has set a substantial sum of capital towards the funding of the
Cohesion policy. Cohesion policy involves regional and social policy activities of a redistributive
nature. Least developed nations have access to these funds to increase economic competitiveness
and eventually growth. The Metro system in Warsaw, for example, was funded by EU capital
through cohesion policies in order to better assist Poland with infrastructural investment.
Sustainable growth of natural resources, on the other hand, tackles the need to create a
stable agricultural and rural economic and social environment. The Common Agricultural Policy,
for example, aims to secure a stable standard of living for farmers as well as ensure a safe and
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stable food supply for the bloc. Throughout European history, the continent endured cycles of
famine brought upon crop failures. The Common Agricultural Policy has created a safety net for
those dependent on crop yields as well as ensuring the food shortage is mitigated through the
exchange of crops from one region within the EU bloc to another. This has helped Europe
become increasingly agriculturally independent and self-sustainable in case of a famine or crop
failure. In recent times, due to the success of the Common Agricultural Policy, and the rising
concern of climate change, the EU has switched from self-sufficient to more environmentally
friendly focused agricultural initiatives. The Programme for the Environment and Climate
Action, for example, aim to restore lost ecosystems within the EU due to mal agricultural
practices and sponsor a more environmentally friendly agricultural framework, best suited for the
producers.
Although Smart and inclusive growth and the Sustainable growth of natural resources
make up roughly around 73 percent of the total EU budget, there is still a substantial amount of
funding directed towards initiatives concerning, Security, citizenship, justice, and a more Global
Europe, as well as the overall cost of administering the entirety of the European Union. Unlike
with the case of increasing the rate of revenue in the EU, a redirecting of funds from pre-existing
plans and funds, would disproportionately the poorer and/or less developed member states who
are in greater dependence of Cohesion funding allocations which make up a total of one-third of
the entire budgetary expenditure. Cohesion funding, which is granted to EU member states with
a Gross National Income (GNI) of less than 90% of the EU average, is designed to help member
states become more economically competitive. Investments in infrastructure and technology,
allow for these member states to increase the likelihood for companies and manufacturers to
make the move to the member states thus further stimulating growth in their respective
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economies. By decreasing spending such as with the Cohesion Funding, many of these member
states will not be able to pay for certain investment projects, thus increasing resentment towards
the EU.
Although there will be a decrease in the levels in spending in programs such as the
Cohesion funding, many of the member states that use to receive cohesion funding may find
other ways to make up for the loss in EU assistance. Leaders of Hungary and Poland, in recent
years have been vocal about their desire to build up strong militaries in their respective countries.
An increase in funding for larger security and defense capabilities, would allow member states
like Hungary and Poland to expand their national military capabilities. As EU member states
with external EU borders, the security of these member states is a matter of security for the entire
Union. The strengthening of security around the external EU borders with the use of EU
resources, although contradictory to the policies and rhetoric implemented the populist
movements within these countries, is supported by Poland and Hungary.
Once the matter of funding is resolved, the European Union would need an organization
tasked with providing judgement on whether to engage in an intervention. Within the current
defense policy, the decision to intervene militarily or through civilian task forces relies heavily
on the European Council. In order to intervene under the guise of the EU, there must be
unanimity in favor of the intervention. If unanimity is not reached the plan to intervene fails. On
the other hand, if the European Council votes hold a unanimous vote in favor of the plan,
member states interested in participating in the intervention are then allowed to organize the
course of action. If needed the member states are allowed to use NATO assets in order to better
implement the plan for intervention. Based on the preferences of the various member states, the
process for decision making may stay the same or be changed. Most if not all member states are
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inclined to maintain the current phrasing of the treaties. Currently, there are no proposals for the
reformation of the decision-making process. There are though debates on NATO’s role within
the decision making role.
Once the decision-making process has been approved, the EU would need to work on the
operation capacity of the EU military. Currently, the EU is highly dependent on NATO for
commander centers and the organization of an intervention. Although the Common Defense and
Security Policy, reserves the right for member states to host a militaristic or civilian task force in
a member states’ military complexes, infrastructure and policy constraints prevent many member
states to host their task forces. Instead, NATO hosts these organizations in order to better equip
the task force. Under the proposal for an EU military, the EU would be responsible for creating
the necessary structural plans to increase its capability to host larger task forces. In President
Macron’s speech to the European community at Sorbonne University, he affords to host the EU’s
military operation within the French military institutions. Although a good temporary fix to the
lack of institutional support for an EU military, the EU will invest in the creation of
infrastructure meant to hold the EU’s military capability. Creating this infrastructure will not
only make help the EU become more independent in terms of
With sustainable funding, a decision-making organization, and an operations
infrastructure, the EU would be able to operate military and/or civilian intervention task forces,
independently from other non-EU actors. Although the EU would have a common be able to
assemble and manage a common military, an investment in the industrial capabilities within the
bloc would prove to be advantageous to a developing EU military. In a Speech by President
Jean-Claude Juncker at the Defense and Security Conference Prague in regards to the defense
mechanisms of Europe, President Juncker points out the inefficiencies in defense spending
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within the EU compared to similar global actors such as the United States. In this speech,
President Juncker states, “There are 178 – as the Prime Minister said – different weapon systems
in the EU, compared to 30 in the U.S. We allow ourselves the luxury of having 17 different types
of combat tanks while the United States is able to manage perfectly well with just one model.”
By coordinating efforts in the production of military related supplies, the EU would be able to
produce higher quantities of high quality supplies, thus leaving extra funding for research and
development of new technologies, for example in the fields of anti-missiles capabilities and air to
air refueling of military aircrafts.
With the EU’s diverse manufacturing capabilities as well as the creation of more
industries in regions of the EU not yet industrialized, the EU would be able to produce goods in a
more efficient way while benefiting the manufacturing sector of industrial member states and
increase the possibility of industries to spring up in less industrial member states. While the
creation of a European Defense Budget will not replace a member state’s national spending on
the military and security initiatives, the European Defense Budget will allow member states the
freedom to investment more funds into research and development.32 Countries such as France
and Germany who already have strong military capabilities, would be able increase the amount
of funding for research and development. Countries with less developed militaries such as
Poland and Hungary, on the other hand, would be able to invest more into their respective
militaries. Although many member states would be able to increase their levels of spending on
research and development, poorer and less developed member states would benefit the most from
higher levels of coordination amongst member states because this can allow industries not yet
developed to be created within these member states.
32
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Although many of these member states, currently hold skeptical views toward the EU,
investments within these member states may help mitigate these skeptical views. Many populist
leaders feed from the frustrations held by the belief the EU is not helping them prosper. Instead
policies such as increasing asylum intake in every member state, are viewed as harmful to the
economies of these member states. By increasing the amount of funding funneled into these
member states, residents of these member states are more likely to embrace further integration
policies and expansion initiatives.

Internal EU Military Debate
Since the release of plans for the creation of the European Union military, many leaders
from around the EU have expressed either their support, rejection, or neutrality regarding the
plan.33 These views are greatly affected by the position the member state holds within the
European Union and its respective effects on the member state’s internal political developments.
Thanks to much debate, many of the position held by member states have changed since the start
of this paper. Reasons for the support or rejection of the EU military range through a variety of
different principles.

Cases of Member States in Favor of a EU Military
One of the most vocal member states, in favor of implementing a European Union Army,
is France. Under the presidency of current French President Emmanuel Macron, and its position
as a major actor within the EU, France’s plan to create a EU military ignited a debate within the
bloc. Quickly various member states pronounced their support, rejection, or neutrality toward the
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proposal. With the French President, Emmanuel Macron, as the champion for the creation of the
EU military, France has remained at the forefront. Although the French have been supportive of
a EU military since the beginning of the EU, French support for the EU military was reignited
with President Macron’s controversial speech proposing a EU military only a few months after
being France’s newly elected President. At the start of his Presidential term in May 2017,
President Emmanuel Macron inherited a France where only 38% of all French citizens polled
had a favorable view of the European Union.34
President Macron’s inauguration came at the heels of the defeat of National Rally
candidate Marine Le Pen for President. Marine Le Pen, who ran on a political platform centered
around a withdrawal of France from the EU and Eurozone and a native ‘French’ first, was able to
garner 34% of the popular vote.35 36 President Macron, on the other hand, ran on a platform
hopeful for further EU integration in the areas of defense as well as a plan to combat terrorism.37
President Macron’s speech to the European community at Sorbonne University, began the
transformation of the way in which France views the European Union. In his speech, President
Macron does not speak about the European Union as a story of success and triumph but rather as
a story of hope in a more positive future. When referring to ideas of populism and nationalism
within the bloc, President Macron says, “They reassure us and, I dare say, they could tomorrow
clinch victory, not because the peoples are gullible! Not because the European idea is dead! But
because our weakness, blindness or lack of awareness have created the conditions for their
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victory.” President Macron recognizes there are flaws within the current state of the EU but that
does not mean all hope is lost. Europe must be willing to work towards a more unified Europe in
order to achieve a more unified Europe.
One of France’s primary reasons for the creation of an independent EU military, is to
increase the EU’s sovereignty in light of the political and economic changes occurring in the
world. With the rise of populism in the United States and an increase in the implementation of
isolationist policies within the United States, the dependence of the EU on NATO has become a
liability due to NATO’s heavy reliance on the United States for funding and operational support.
With the election of President Trump, the relationship between the two nations have continued to
sour. American criticisms regarding European’s involvement in their own security have turned
into threats directed at any possible future involvement of the US through NATO. In a tweet
posted July 10, 2018, President of United States, Donald Trump wrote, “Getting ready to leave
for Europe. First meeting - NATO. The U.S. is spending many times more than any other
country in order to protect them. Not fair to the U.S. taxpayer. On top of that we lose $151
Billion on Trade with the European Union. Charge us big Tariffs (& Barriers)!” Roughly an hour
later, President Trump posts the following: “NATO countries must pay MORE, the United States
must pay LESS. Very Unfair!”38 President Trump has continuously criticizes the many NATO
partners for their ‘delinquent’ actions regarding defense spending. In response, President Macron
the EU should increase its funding for EU led plans towards security and defense in order to
decrease the bloc’s reliance on the United States, particularly though NATO. President Trumps,
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continued isolation and protectionist policies, have led to the souring of relations like with the
case of France.
Although NATO resentment remains one of the main motivators for the creation of an
EU military, it is not the only reasons for French support. The rise of populism within he bloc
has caused the halt of many integration plans. Even within the confines of the EU exterior
borders, old sentiments that launched the world wars, such as nationalism, protectionism,
isolationism, are being reinvigorated by populist movements. These movements feed on the
feeling of resentment. For many residents of member states part of the EU, policies enact in all
member states may have caused an unequal balance of power amongst member states. President
Macron argues, a more integrated EU will decrease the amount of resentment felt towards the
EU. Although the bloc has made many positive steps toward integration, negative sentiments
regarding the bloc have become to take traction among many member states. “It is so much
easier to never explain where we want to go, where we want to lead our people, and to remain
with hidden arguments, because we have simply lost sight of the objective."39
France has also expressed its desire, for the EU to become a global actor. Although the
EU has made many strides toward a stronger economy and financial services, the EU still lacks
legitimacy in regards to its military strength. In his speech at Sorbonne University, President
Macron compares the same Sorbonne University to the EU. Much like Sorbonne University, the
European Union did not start off similar to its present day incarnation, but rather as an idea
supported by only a handful of leaders. Over time the fundamental ideas for these organizations
grew in scope and notoriety, soon becoming an idea supported by most people. Sorbonne
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University and the European Union have garnered a high stature and strength, not because they
started off with this recognition, but rather because it has been cultivated and nourished over
time. In order for the EU to garner the recognition it desires, it must begin to create a force
designed to intervene for the stability and safety of civilians.
The creation of an EU military would also allow for the expansion of French military
capacities and an increase of spending for the purpose of research and development of new
technologies and capabilities. By increasing the levels of investment in research and
development, France would be able to gain an upper hand in the trading and production of newer
technologies. As a member state with an already large economy, large deposits of raw materials,
and a large supply of labor, France would be able to produce many supplies for the EU military
and other EU member states, thus expanding the reach of French goods within the bloc. By
opening up new markets in the military industry, France would be able to expand its economic
influence through the EU military.
Although Germany disagrees with the need for the EU to become completely free from
NATO, Germany is in agreement on the need for a EU military. German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, in 2017 President Donald Trump is not one the European community can rely upon,
therefore a greater share of the burdens regarding security and defense shall fall on the backs of
the European community. Much like France, Germany’s large economy and ability to produce
military grade weaponry, increases the amount of investment Germany can pour into research
and development. Although Germany would like to increase the amount of economic transaction
through the sell of military supplies can bring to the country’s economy, Germany has also taken
a stand against the sell of weapons to non-EU actors. Similar sentiments are shared by member
states such as Spain and recently Italy.
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Cases of Member States Against a EU Military
Unlike Germany and France, the plan for the creation of a EU army, has garnered the
rejection of some member states with weaker and/or smaller economies with some being led by
Eurosceptic populist leaders. Member states such as Poland has expressed its rejection for the
EU military, in favor of creating closer ties with the United States. The reasons for a polish
rejection to the creation of a EU military can be explained with three reasons: Poland has been
unable to reform its domestic defense industry; the existence of an overwhelming preference for
closer relationships with the US in the fields of defense and security; and the lack of an industrial
strategy.40
In the initial period after Poland’s ascension to a full member of the EU, Poland was very
eager to catch up in strength to fellow EU member states such as France and Germany. In the
realm of security and defense, Poland was very excited to join the other EU member states in
further defense integration, becoming one of the first member states to propose a common
defense mechanism, along with France and Germany. This all took a spin for the worst, when in
2015 the Polish citizens elected a new government. This new PiS run government, would
separate itself from other members and would fight against continued EU integration.
Winning under an Eurosceptic agenda, the PiS became the primary party in Poland.
Views of unilateralism and nationalism within Poland were only strengthened with the rise of
President Donald Trump. President Trump’s emphasis on unilateralism and the need for strong
nationalist narratives, only justified and strengthened these ideas in Poland. The PiS used the
migration crisis and the EU’s asylum intake to justify the evils of integration many in the PiS
party focused on. Poland’s lower relative power and the forceful intake of migrants in a country
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not equipped to take in migrants raised the resentment towards the EU. Any further integration
would be met by a Polish veto including the common defense mechanism proposed alongside
France and Germany.

Expected Outcome
Although the European Union has gained a significant amount of support since it was
first announced, the path to the full implementation of the EU military is far away. In order for
the creation of infrastructure for the EU military to start, the EU would need to approve the
European Defense Fund as well as vote unilaterally on the creation of such institutions. Although
many member states have decided to support initiatives to create the EU military, the EU must
vote unanimously for any furthering of any initiative to pass. Countries like Poland need to be
convinced the adoption of a common defense mechanism such as the EU military would work to
all the member states’ advantage.
Despite providing facts regarding the benefits of adopting the EU military as the primary
form for EU defense, member states such as Poland may never approve the military. Populist
movements, such is the case with Poland, depend on the resentment and frustrations felt but its
citizens to rise to power. Once in power, these populist governments, continue to perpetuate fear
in policies that will prevent the further spread of EU regulations onto the member state’s system
of law. In doing so, the populist leaders will have gained control of the government as well as
secured the continuation of the hold through fear of the EU. Knowing this, the EU military may
be more difficult to implement. Policies that lead to the implementation of a full EU military
under the sole direction of EU institutions, have been placed in motion. Major investments in
military capabilities through the European Defense Fund, for example, allow for the investment
in the construction in bases capable of holding EU sized military forces.
38

Although it may seem difficult to create the EU military at the moment, it does not
discount the fact, the EU military can be created within the next 60 years. Like Macron said in
his speech to the European community at Sorbonne University: “
Europe, too, is an idea. An idea supported for many centuries by pioneers,
optimists and visionaries, and it is always up to us to claim it for our own. Because the
best ideas, those which drive us forward, which improve people’s lives, are always
fragile. And Europe will only live through the idea that we have of it. It is our
responsibility to bring it to life, make it ever better and stronger, to not stop at the form
that historic circumstances have shaped it into. Because this form may change, but the
idea remains, and its ambition must be ours.”
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